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Communitarianism: 
A German Perspective* 
"Regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of 
associated life. It is the idea of community life itself."l This sentence of John 
Dewey taken from his 1927 book, "The Public and its Problems," sounds very 
strange to German ears. The semantics of the term "community" in America are 
very different from the cultural traditions in Germany, and this difference is 
certq.inly bigger than in the case of the term "democracy." In Germany, every 
positive use of the term "community" today will meet with the skepticism of 
those who suspect therein antidemocratic effects. "Whoever calls for more 
community in this country will immediately come under the suspicion to be an 
old-fashioned fool or a sinister ideologist."2 The use of the term 
"Volksgemeinschaft" in the Nazi propaganda undeniably served the purpose of 
disparaging the democratic order of the Weimar republic. I will personally never 
forget that in the time of Walter Ulbricht the East German state behind its wall 
called itself "a socialist community of men and women" ("sozialistische 
Menschengemeinschaft") . 
Prior to 1933, the term "community" was indeed a proprietary codeword used 
by anti-democratic social movements in Germany. But it would be misleading to 
extend this observation back to the earlier phases of German intellectual history. 
Many of the elements of meaning that constitute the opposition between 
"community" and "society" have existed in Germany at the latest since the 
romantic critiques of the Enlightenment. These elements, however, were in the 
beginning not stably and consistently split up in these two terms as we can find 
out when we read authors using these terms, for example, Friedrich 
Schleiermacher or Heinrich von Kleist.3 It was one of the early sociologists, 
Ferdinand Tennies, who developed a clear conceptual dichotomy in this 
semantic field. 4 But Tennies did not do so because of cultural pessimism or 
*This lecture was given in Bloomington for the Indiana University Institute and Society for 
Advanced Study on September 23, 1994. 
lJohn Dewey, The Public and Its Problems. New York 1927, p.148. 
2Wolfgang Fach, Der Zeuge Tocqueville, in: Christel Zahlmann (ed.), Kommunitarismus in der 
Diskussion. Frankfurt/ Main 1992, p.42. 
3For the German history of the concepts "Gemeinschaft" ("community") and "Gesellschaft" 
("society" ) d . the excellent article by Manfred Riedel, in: Otto Brunner /Werner Conze/Reinhart 
Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache 
in Deutschland. Stuttgart 1975, Vol. 2, pp. 801-862. 
4Ferdinand T6nnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. (1887). Darmstadt 1972. 
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reactionary thinking. He placed his hopes in the strengthening of co-operative 
social forms within the framework of modern societies and found potentials for 
such a development, above all, in the trade union movement. At the end of his 
political biography he joined the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Outside of the 
scholarly discourse, it was the middle-class youth movement around the turn of 
the century that filled the term "community" with intense sentiments, but this 
culturally productive movement was much more ambiguous in its political 
repercussions than those searching for precursors of the Nazi movement are 
often willing to admit. And the Nazi use of the term "community" for the whole 
of the totalitarian state should not make us forget that the same term, in the 
thinking of leading members of the German Resistance/ served as an orientation 
for the reconstruction of society after the fall of the Nazi regime. Yet, though it 
would clearly be exaggerated and historically unfair to reduce the term 
"community" in Germany to the anti-democratic use of it, nobody in Germany 
would have said what Dewey did: that we should understand "democracy" as 
the fullest embodiment of the principles which underlie all social life. 
Things are easier in America in this respect. The term" community" must be 
more innocent here for the simple reason that it covers a wider spectrum of 
meaning-from the merely territorial ("Gemeinde") to the utopian 
("Kommune"). In the American moral and political discourse the term 
"community" still is-as Robert Bellah's group has observed in their 
interviews-"a kind of 'very special word' that always meant something good."6 
Terms like "clique", "aggregation" or "lifestyle enclave" are used in the 
sociological literature if the authors tend to deny the positive traits of 
"community" -and the question whether the name of community is 
appropriate in a case such as the "gay community" may be quite a substantive 
one. But even when the American debates about community have connotations 
similar to the German ones, one big difference remains: the discourse on 
"community" in the U.S. has always been part and parcel of communication 
within a liberal-democratic society, whereas in Germany-and this is true 
regardless of the personal convictions of the single contributors-the debate took 
place in a fundamentally illiberal society and always had the tendency to 
SHans Mommsen, Kreisauer Vorstellungen als Antwort auf die Herausforderung des 
Nationalsozialismus, in: Dietmar Petzina/Jiirgen Reulecke (eds.), Bevolkerung, Wirtschaft, 
Gesellschaft seit der Industrialisierung. Festschrift fur Wolfgang Kollmann. Dortmund 1900, pp. 389-
397. 
6Richard Madsen, Contentless Consensus: The Political Discourse of a Segmented Society, in: Alan 
Wolfe (ed.), America at Century's End. Berkeley 1991, pp. 440-460, here p . 451.-The remark on 
Robert Bellah's group refers, of course, to: Robert Bellah/Richard Madsen/William Sullivan/Ann 
Swidler IStephen Tipton, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. 
Berkeley 1985, and, by the same authors, The Good Society. New York 1991. 
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question the principles of modern individualism, market economy and 
democratic self-government. In contrast to that, the American debates 
articulated the sensibility toward cultural losses caused by unrestricted 
individualism without envisaging a completely different form of modernity. 
German cultural critics on the right and the left have always looked down upon 
these American traditions, but the time may have come to see things differently. 
All I have said so far may sound as if I were overly interested in a quarrel 
about words. The reason why the semantics of "community" attracts my 
attention is, however, that this term is crucial for a major new development in 
American moral and political reasoning, namely so-called communitarianism. 
Communitarianism developed slowly during the 1980s out of a reaction against 
Harvard philosopher's John Rawls' magisterial book" A Theory of Justice" 
published in 1971 and since then widely respected as one of the crucial 
philosophical works of the second half of the twentieth century.7 Rawls breathed 
new life into contemporary liberalism by emphasizing the difference between 
the value of justice and the value of individual or collective happiness. Contrary 
to classical utilitarianism, Rawls established an absolute priority of justice over 
happiness since for him each individual may have a different notion of 
happiness and each orientation toward collective happiness must result in the 
imposition of values or life-styles on others. The only task for the collectivity has 
to be to make possible a fair coordination of the differing concepts of the good 
life. Thus each citizen would be able to pursue his or her own vision of 
happine·ss as long as this is compatible with the same freedom of all other 
citizens. Rawls replaced the Kantian idea of an autonomous subject obeying the 
categorical imperative by the ingenious construction of an "original position" in 
which we can test our orientations as to their justice. tn this original position, we 
act behind a "veil of ignorance" about our own social status and membership, 
advantages and disadvantages in the social order we are going to problematize 
or to constitute. This is a way to establish fundamental principles for a just social 
order and to examine more specific questions from the viewpoint of justice. 
Rawls's approach was severely criticized because of the view of the self, of the 
human person implicit in his construction of an "original position". The critics 
called the self in Rawls "unencumbered", i.e., a self that looks as if it were 
independent of its own values, intentions or goals.8 Such a notion of the self 
could only be adequate with respect to voluntary associations, which we may 
enter or leave according to our taste; but it is clearly inadequate with respect to 
those forms of social life like the family of our childhood which we did not 
7John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass. 1971. 
8Michael Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, in: Political Theory 1 
(1984), pp. 81-96; d. also by the same author: Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge 1982. 
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choose and which played a constitutive role for our personalities. Even if we 
take into consideration that Rawls' construction was a mere proposal for a 
thought experiment and not an empirical assumption (since as such it would fall 
way behind the crucial insights into the human self developed by George 
Herbert Mead and his followers in modern social psychology), one might ask 
why anybody should enter into such an experimental situation and follow its 
results if there were no preceding feelings of obligation toward particular fellow 
human beings. The term "communitarianism" became generally accepted 
during the 1980s for the authors who criticized Rawls in such a vein. This debate 
among moral philosophers has practically come to an end now in a way which is 
highly desirable for such discussions in general, namely by a consensus reached 
via mutual criticism and self-revision. But on that basis a network of 
philosophers, social scientists, other scholars, and politicians was formed that 
intends to dispute the hegemony not so much of Rawls, but of utilitarian 
individualism in America. The agenda of this communitarian network includes 
paradigmatic changes in some scientific disciplines like economics and other 
social sciences and a remoralization of political and social life from the family 
and the school to the influence of special-interest groups on the national level, 
from restrictions on individual liberty in the interest of public safety and public 
health to nonlegal remedies against discrimination.9 
This American intellectual movement has reached Germany with considerable 
delay. During the 1980s it was only academic specialists in philosophy who 
followed it, and though several books by authors like Robert Bellah, Alasdair 
MacIntyre, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer appeared in German 
translations, they were not perceived as being in any sense connected to one 
another. The collapse of the communist regimes in Europe in 1989 changed this 
situation completely. Why did these events produce such a widespread interest 
in communitarianism and make this American intellectual current almost 
fashionable in Germany? I see three main reasons for this interesting turn in the 
intellectual climate. 
The first reason lies in the problems related to German reunification itself. The 
larger part of the West German population had lost its emotional bonds to the 
Germans in the East. They had come to take pride in their being part of the 
Western world and its political and cultural traditions. When the East Germans 
in the fall of 1989 turned the slogan "We are the people" -which had been the 
popular catchword against the authoritarian rule of communism-into "We are 
9Cf. Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community. Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian 
Agenda. New York 1993. The volume reprints the "Communitarian Platform" which is crucial for 
the communitarian movement. 
4 
one people" -referring to German unity-most West-Germans responded with 
very mixed feelings. The victory of democracy in the East was clearly welcomed, 
but unification gave rise to fears either about new tendencies toward German 
hegemony in Europe or about the costs and incalculable economic consequences 
of such a step. After reurtification (in October 1990) this debate gained additional 
momentum because now the tension between an ethnically based "national 
identity" and a normatively based "constitutional patriotism" intensified as did 
the need for a justification of long-term economic sacrifices for the West German 
population. Understandably enough, after the horrible crimes of the Third Reich, 
terms like "national solidarity," "the priority of the community" and "sacrifice" 
have incredibly negative connotations in Germany. But, on the other handr the 
feeling that the tasks of reunification cannot be solved on the basis of 
individualist liberalism bec~me stronger. This prepared the soil for an interest in 
American communitarianism as a "purification" of the German tradition, as 
Albert Hirschman said.1o 
Secondly, many intellectuals in West Germany interested in alternatives to the 
existing political order, without admiring the communist regimes nevertheless 
entertained a subliminal affinity to a tradition which seemed to have deviated 
from an originally attractive path. Even the most outspoken anti-communist 
Social Democrats shared with Marxism an emphasis on a strong centralized state 
as the most important actor for social reforms. The collapse of communism 
finally opened the way for a new thinking. As soon as the utopian hopes for a 
social order different from Western democratic capitalism are abandoned, 
debates within that type of society must gain enormous interest. The question is 
no longer posed as in Werner Sombart's time: "Why is there no socialism in the 
United States?" It is now more appropriate to ask: "Why has liberalism in its 
individualist and its communitarian version been so weak in Germany?" And 
this question immediately leads to an interest in less state-centered and more 
community-oriented types of social action and social reform. 
Thirdly, as in the U.s., the slogan of "communitarianism" in Germany 
integrates diverse social problems which had emerged before 1989 and which 
are analytically independent of the repercussions of reunification. The future of 
the welfare state under new demographic conditions and in view of 
international economic competition, the restructuring of the labor market given 
high structural unemployment rates, the loss of loyalty toward political parties, 
all these hitherto unrelated debates find a common denominator under the label 
'I communitarianism'l. 
lOAlbert Hirschman, in: Korber-Stiftung (ed.), Wieviel Gemeinsinn braucht die liberale 
Gesellschaft? Hamburg 1993, p. 20. 
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Sociology has always been interested in the processes that lead to the decline 
of communities. This interest may even be called constitutive for this discipline 
in Europe and America. But early American sociology differed in an interesting 
way from its European counterpart. In Europe the dichotomy of community and 
society was interpreted as a sequence with two phases: for example, an age of 
"community" was thought to be followed by an age of "society." For the 
Americans, however, the pragmatist idea of a creative reconstruction of habits 
made a scheme with three phases more plausible. In their perspective there has 
to be a third phase: namely the genesis of new communities. The classic case 
here are studies about immigration in which the decline of European village-
communities was not considered to give rise to a faceless mass society of 
isolated individuals but to new forms of community in the ethnic neighborhoods 
of the American metropolitan areas. So the loss of community is not necessarily 
without a substitute; even "better" communities can take the place of the lost 
community. These new communities are no longer natural ones, but have to be 
created. However, this creation cannot be arbitrarily managed. In this process, 
political actors and social scientists can at least be helpful. ll 
Sociology can contribute to the contemporary debate about communitarianism 
by opening this debate toward empirical clarification. It can ask in an 
empirically-controlled way how justified the diagnosis of an on-going 
weakening of social relations is; and it can, in addition to that, try to find out 
which community resources may help revitalize social life, and thus contribute 
to the solution of our most pressing social problems. In the following I will 
sketch some answers to these questions in a way which constantly pays attention 
to the comparison between Germany and the United States. 
The empirical examination of community decline can begin with an almost 
trivial question: when did the processes which allegedly led to this decline set 
in? How necessary it is to ask this question immediately becomes clear when we 
observe that we often talk about the decline of a type of community which only 
came into being when many historians or sociologists already spoke of 
community decline. When everybody in Europe described the loss of the village-
community those homogeneous working-class districts developed. Today we 
may regret or at least describe their decline. The historian Thomas Bender has 
demonstrated in a funny way how differently the decline of community is dated 
in the U.S.12 One analysis of John Winthrop's Boston, for example, regards the 
decline of community and the triumph of individualism and materialism over 
llHans Joas, Pragmatism in American Sociology, in: H. J., Pragmatism and Social Theory. Chicago 
1993, pp. 14-51. 
12Thomas Bender, Community and Social Change in America. New Brunswick, N .J. 1978, pp. 45 ff. 
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the Puritan ideals of fraternity as completed by the year 1650. Others prefer to 
date the same process in the late 17th century or early 18th century. The increase 
of republican thinking in the run-up to the American revolution is sometimes 
considered as an attempt at reviving the declining traditional"community". A 
vast literature situates the origins of the American police in the social problems 
caused by rapid urbanization and thus connects the development of separate 
institutions of social control with the erosion of traditional communities. In 
particular, the period after the American Civil War (1861-65) and even more the 
so-called Progressive Era (1896-1914) are depicted in many historical works as 
phases in which a society mainly consisting of diverse autonomous 
municipalities with highly informal and predominantly face-to-face relations 
was transformed into a more and more centralized society with impersonal and 
purposively-oriented social relations. The same scheme of interpretation can be 
found, however, in the literature about the 1920s, and up into our present age. 
This mere listing challenges, of course, our belief in the correctness of the given 
assumptions. More than this, the whole framework loses its plausibility, when 
we can ask (with Thomas Bender): "How many times can community collapse in 
America?" 
But such an ironic relativization of the permanent outcry of decline does not 
mean that there is no such thing as a decline of communities. It makes clear, 
however, that we should not blow up particular tendencies to one master trend 
of unilinear and comprehensive decline without weighing against each other 
tendencies and counter-tendencies. Among communitarian philosophers, 
Michael Walzer has attempted to concretize sociologically the contemporary 
social origins of a loss of community when he talks about the "four mobilities": 
geographic, social, family and political mobility.13 These are, of course, very 
different phenomena. Frequent moves from one place to another, climbing up or 
down the social ladder, attitudes toward marital fidelity and divorce or the 
strength of one's affiliation with 'a political party obviously have to be 
distinguished. If you talk about the loss of community today you have to make 
clear whether you mean a decrease in the commitment to the nuclear family, the 
extended family, friendship, parish, local municipality, urban neighborhood, 
political party, trade union, voluntary association or whatever. Those differences 
might only be neglected if one assumes that the developments in all these areas 
take the same direction. Let me give you a few examples how careful we have to 
be in this respect. 
13Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, in: Political Theory 18 (1990), pp. 6-
23. 
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One af the mast frequently mentianed causes af cammunity decline is the 
degree af regianal mability. Walzer, amang athers, assumes that Americans 
mave mare frequently than any ather natian in histary, at least since the age af 
the "V6Ikerwanderung," the migratian af the peaples, and with the exceptian af 
the namads ar the refugees af wars and civil wars. But sacialagical research has 
faund aut that ather camp arable states, ex-calanial settler-states like Australia 
and Canada are nat cansiderably different fram the U.s. in that respect and that 
geagraphical mability has been slightly but canstantly decreasing in the U.S. far 
a relatively lang time.14 That is to. say that a cantemparary decline af cammunity 
can hardly be traced back to. geagraphical mability.-Anather phenamenan 
which is aften used as an illustratian far the alleged decline af cammunity is the 
dissalutian af ethnically homageneaus neighbarhaads in American 
metrapalitan areas. But we shauld nat farget that ethnic hamageneity is nat 
replaced by camplete heterageneity, whatever that wauld be, but by anather 
type af hamageneity, namely ecanamic hamageneity.15 In the suburbs this 
ecanamic hamageneity makes sacial intercaurse within the neighbarhoad quite 
easy. Madern technical facilities allaw clase sacial relatians with pea pIe who. live 
farther away so. that even thase who. are nat deeply embedded in their 
neighbarhaads shauld nat be cansidered to. live autside af any type af clase 
cammunities. Far the inner-city paar, haw ever, the increased passibilities far 
black middle-class peaple to. mave aut af the black ghettas has paradaxically 
resulted in a deteriaratian af their saciallife because af the lass af visible rale-
madels representing achievement-arientatian and sacial mability.16 
Walzer's emphasis an the "faur mabilities" is nat anly misleading because 
they are nat empirically verifiable, but also. because he leaves the impressian that 
the different mabilities are parallel phenamena; he ignares the passibility that 
they are interrelated in ways that are different fram pasitive mutual 
reinfarcement. Again, a few hints must be sufficient. Increasing emplayment af 
wamen, far example, may reduce and nat increase geagraphical mability 
because finding af jabs far bath partners in anather place is mare difficult than 
far ane. Cammuting instead af migratian is then a typical salutian. If the 
attachment to. palitical parties an the natianallevel is gaing dawn, this may 
increase and nat reduce the interest in and commitment to. lacal palitics. If ties 
with a particular religiaus denaminatian are getting laaser, this daes nat 
14Theodore Caplow et al. , Recent Social Trends in the United States 1960-90. Montreal 1991, p. 7. 
15Claude Fischer, Ambivalent Communities: How Americans Understand Their Localities, in: Alan 
Wolfe (ed.), America at Century's End. Berkeley 1991, pp. 79-90. 
16William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged. The Inner City, the Underclass and Public 
Policy. Chicago 1987. 
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necessarily suggest that the importance of the churches is going down in 
general, since one may more freely choose between denominations but remain 
firmly within the religious sector ("church-shopping"). All these briefly 
mentioned facts produce at least some doubts about a continual decline of 
community in the U.S. 
A particularly striking case can be found in Robert Wuthnow's recently 
pub~ished study on self-help and support groups in America. He asserts that 
about 40% of all Americans are members of a self-organized community which 
meets regularly and in brief intervals and which pursues a common intention 
not reducible to common utilitarian interests: "Sunday school classes, Bible 
study groups, Alcoholics Anonymous and other twelve-step groups, youth 
groups and singles groups, book discussion clubs, sports and hobby groups, and 
political or civic groups."17 Two thirds of these groups have close relations to 
religion. Common origins of the group members or the feeling of unavoidable 
membership are the exception here, not the. rule. But this does not restrict these 
groups, as some cultural critics assume, to a form of collective narcissism. 
Mutual help in emergencies is clearly expected from the members; talking about 
one's biography and pressing personal problems is among the informal 
obligations. These groups, or networks of such groups, are often the point of 
departure for more comprehensive civic activities. The identities of the groups' 
members are deeply impregnated by the life of these communities; the values 
which are the orientation of one's actions are elaborated and concretized in such 
groups. Communities like those can be called the communicative infrastructure 
of a democratic society. 
Let me now switch to Germany and follow the same guiding thread, namely 
the question whether we observe there a continual decline of community. One 
can immediately mark one major difference between the two countries when one 
considers the main cultural traditions which provide what sociologists like 
Robert Bellah call "community resources." I have already mentioned the 
weakness of a purely individualistic tradition of "negative freedom" (Isaiah 
Berlin) in Germany. But even the community resources are very different. The 
republican tradition of thinking-in the sense of self-government of free-and 
virtuous citizens -, so strong in America since the 18th, century is hardly existent 
in Germany. Liberalism has always had a difficult position in the German-
speaking countries, and classical republicanism had only little influence outside 
of the Hanseatic towns or Switzerland. The biblical traditions of community 
orientation played an important role in Germany, too, but-in contrast to the 
17Robert Wuthnow, Sharing the Journey. Support Groups and America's New Quest for 
Community. New York 1994, p . 4. 
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U.s.-not in the form of a rich pluralism of denominations, but in the clear 
separation of Catholics versus Lutherans, and not in an intermingling of these 
denominations in different regional areas, but in a clear pattern of purely 
Catholic or purely Lutheran small states, because it was the religion of the ruler 
which decided the religion of his subjects. Two other cultural traditions 
containing strong community-orientations have played a much more influential 
role in Germany than in the U.S.: a nationalist-conservative tradition on the one 
hand, and a social democratic-trade unionist tradition on the other. Both formed 
milieus of a very distinct character and infused large parts of the population 
with value-orientations of the non-individualist kind. 
Despite the fact that the twelve years of Nazi totalitarianism in Germany 
weakened all these milieus by intentionally destroying the workers' 
organizations, impeding the churches and devaluating even the conservative-
nationalist subcultures, not to mention the horrors done to Jewish citizens, all 
three milieus survived these years in weakened forms and, after 1945, began to 
reconstruct themselves. In Harold Hurwitz's fascinating five-volume 
sociological study of Berlin in the post-war era,18 this reconstitution of social 
milieus under the Allied government takes on a graphic quality. The major 
difference was that before 1933, the German East experienced the loss of the 
social basis of the aristocracy and, as a consequence of the expulsion of millions 
of refugees from the territories now under Polish control, a mix of Catholics and 
Lutherans which then developed was much more thorough than what had 
already started to happen during the urbanization processes of the late 19th 
century. Thus the Federal Republic in its early years was an absolutely new 
democratic state on the basis of a slightly changed social structure with 
relatively traditional cultural milieus .. 
This situation changed completely and dramatically as a consequence of what 
was called the "Wirtschaftswunder," the "economic miracle" of the 1950s and 
1960s. The enormous increase of productivity and of the standard of living 
within the experience of one generation destroyed traditional communities more 
than the historical events before 1945 had done. German sociological research on 
social mobility has aptly spoken of an "elevator effect,I/19 that is to say, a process 
in which the whole stratification system of German society moved upwards. A 
large part of the traditional lower class occupations either disappeared 
completely in the transition process to a service-sector economy and post-
industrial society, or was transferred to a new immigrant population from 
Southern European countries, which were not considered permanent or truly 
18Harold Hurwitz, Demokratie und Antikommunismus in Berlin nach 1945. 5 vols. Koln 1983 ff. 
19U1rich Beck, Risikogesellschaft. Frankfurt/Main 1986. 
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part of the German population in general. This process was subjectively 
experienced as personal success and individual climbing up to higher levels of 
stratification. A rapid expansion of the whole system of higher education, which 
began in the early sixties and lasted well through the seventies, enhanced even 
more the conviction of millions of young people that they had superseded the 
milieus into which they had been born. The so-called proletarian milieus and the 
religiously influenced subcultures disappeared almost completely in the course 
of these developments. "Individualisation" and "pluralisation" are the 
fashionable sociological catch-words in Germany, which describe this cultural 
restructuration and signal in their terminology that they emphasize the 
dissolution of traditional community orientations. Ulrich Beck, for example, 
describes the German society as a society of singles who construct their own 
biography in an autonomous way and who no longer experience themselves as 
part of any stable social class. Postmodernist writers exaggerate this already 
exaggerated description even more and talk about the end of the social and the 
reign of the fragmented patch-work identities. 
Again, these assertions are not fully convincing since they clearly ignore all 
counter-tendencies. If we consider, for example, data on membership in 
associations ("Vereine"), political parties etc. we receive a very different image. 
Then Germany appears as a tightly integrated, strongly communitarian, society. 
Twenty-one million Germans (out of 80 million inhabitants) are members of 
sports clubs, 1.8 millions are members of the "Deutsche Sangerbund" (German 
Choral Society), 2.2 millions are members of a political party-not to mention 
trade unions and the churches. The followers of the "individualization" and 
community decline thesis may object that it is often only a small part of the 
membership of these associations that is truly active in them and not only 
passively registered. But then one could argue that formally registered 
associations cover only a very small part of the communitarian activities in 
Germany. There are so many music groups and choirs not formally organized, 
so many sports groups, self-help groups and neighborhood initiatives which are 
not counted in these sociological statistics. In spite of a number of studies on 
individual types of associations, there is no study in Germany yet comparable to 
Bellah's or Wuthnow's studies about the U.S., a fact that may be taken not only 
as an indicator of a part of my current research interests but, more importantly, 
as evidence again that German self-perception suffers even more strongly from 
the perspective of continual community decline than its American counterpart. 
These remarks on Germany were exclusively concentrated on West German 
condition~. East Germany had a different fate after 1945, and in our days we are 
witnessing the rapid adaptation from the results of this Soviet-dominated 
development to the general conditions of the unified German society. From the 
viewpoint of communitarian value-orientations it has to be mentioned that in 
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East Germany socialist values were crucial, but enforced by means of the state, 
whereas the conservative and the Christian milieus were almost completely 
destroyed. The important role of protestant pastors during the anti-communist 
rebellion in 1989 often makes us overlook the fact that the anti-Christian 
communist crusade in East Germany has been terribly successful. Two thirds of 
the East German population are not members of any church, and only 5% of that 
population define themselves as truly religious. The value of working-class 
solidarity was one of the crucial reference points of education and indoctrination 
under the co~unist regime. But it goes without saying that the concrete nature 
of solidarity was defined not from the bottom up, but from the top down. There 
was absolutely no' possibility to organize autonomous groups or activities. In 
some cases even groups which supported official goals were prohibited on 
account of the paranoid world-view of the regime's leaders. Complete lack of 
autonomous groups was one side of the coin; the comprehensive grasp of highly 
centralized mass organizations for everybody was the other side. Within these 
huge organizations one had unavoidably, of course, tendencies toward 
autonomization again and again. Alongside these mass organizations, the state-
run enterprises or agricultural cooperatives played a role for social life 
unimaginable for many people in the West. The VEB (=enterprise owned DY the 
people) and LPG (=agricultural production cooperation) offered much more 
than merely a job. They also provided for child care, vacations, shopping and 
even arbitral jurisdiction. A last type of community specific to communist 
countries has been called the "niche," and one of the most astute observers of 
East German culture has called the whole society a "niche-society."2o Mainly 
because of constant shortages in the provision of goods,large informal networks 
of mutual help developed which were also filled with community-like feelings 
of solidarity, though their real core was clearly instrumental. 
The collapse of the East German regime led to a rapid disintegration of all 
these types of corp.munity. The mass organizations dissolved themselves, the 
industrial and agricultural enterprises were either closed down or lost at least 
most of their additional functions, the "niches" became simply superfluous. This 
is indeed much more than anything in the West, a dram'atic process of decline. It 
is all the more dramatic since it takes place after the consecutive intentional 
destructions of community structures first by the Nazis and then by the 
communists. Many East Germans experience this current process as similarly 
violent. For them Western societies do not present themselves as richly textured 
democratic cultures, but as purely utilitarian-individualist societies, "the 
2°Giinter Gaus. Wo Deutschland liegt. Hamburg 1983. 
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domination of the elbows" as a current saying goes. The introduction of 
democratic institutions in East Germany clearly is not sufficient in itself, since it 
is an open question whether the reconstitution of a communicative 
infrastructure will be able to keep abreast of these developments. 
Eastern Europe has its own parallel to the American debate on 
communitarianism, the "civil society" debate; the developments in East 
Germany after the collapse of communism demonstrate very impressively how 
appropriate this debate was. It is mainly to the Polish trade union movement 
under the name "Solidarity" that the credit goes for having reached the 
conclusion that fighting communism meant more than replacing one ruling elite 
by another, namely a comprehensive reconstruction of a society that was to 
become "differentiated, pluralistic, politically democratic and economically 
market driven." 2l After the fall of communism, however, this debate does not 
shed much light on the details of the reconstitution of communities and a 
differentiated society and, as a result, the experiences of societies with long 
democratic traditions become more and more important in this context. One can 
safely say that Germans and East Europeans interested in democratic theory 
look with utmost attention to the revitalization of democratic theory in the 
U.s.-a development which in itself is clearly restricted up to now to the internal 
problems of the American society. That makes the internationalization of this 
debate in its empirical and its normative aspects so important for all sides. 
Communitarianism should not be misunderstood as a nostalgic attempt to 
reconstruct an over arching and primordial notion of moral consensus nor as a 
return to traditional communities. It is, on the contrary, an attempt to 
reformulate the ideal of democracy in a modern, highly differentiated but not 
necessarily fragmented society. Such an attempt is not necessarily connected to a 
myth of moral decline. In two points it is completely different from the 
democratic slogans of the social movements in the sixties. It accepts the value of 
efficiency and does not define democratization as the abolition of markets and 
bureaucracies where these are superior to democratic means in an instrumental 
sense. And secondly, communitarianism is completely different from the 
progressivism of the sixties and seventies because it separates the combination 
of political democratization with cultural permissiveness which was so 
characteristic of the earlier movements and which alienated many intellectuals 
originally supporting their goals. Communitarianism has learnt the lesson that, 
to put it in old-fashioned terms, self-government presupposes the virtue of the 
citizens. Without self-control and social control or without intense feelings of 
21Jeffrey Alexander, Review of Jean Cohen/ Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, in: 
Contemporary Sociology 22 (1993), p . 798. 
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obligation toward concrete particular communities self-government is 
impossible. Liberation from all such obligations and loosening of all controls 
most often leads to the diffusion of responsibilities and not to efficient and 
responsible self-government. This critical relationship to the cultural 
consequences of the sixties makes it so difficult for contemporary observers to 
classify communitarianism as liberal or conservative, left or right. It evades such 
dichotomous schemes of perception in its insistence on a remoralization of 
politics. The institutional consequences of this reorientation and the more 
technical part of such an endeavor like the theory of action, the self, the genesis 
of values and norms, playa significant role in my work, but here I would rather 
like to end on the optimistic note that a revitalization of the international debate 
on democracy will also enhance the public importance of the sociological 
discipline. 
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